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A B S T R A C T
This paper analyzes discourses and practices of ﬂood response and adaptation to climate change in
Mozambique. It builds on recent publications on climate change adaptation that suggest that the
successes and failures of adaptation highly depend on the cultural and political realms of societal
perceptions and the sensitivity of institutions. To capture this, the paper adopted a multi-sited
ethnographic approach. Acknowledging that there is no central locus of representation that can unveil
the working of disaster response in Mozambique, the paper brings together ﬁve vignettes of research in
different ‘sites’ of concern to the rise in ﬂoods in Mozambique. These are the politics of climate change
adaptation at the national institutional level, societal responses to increased ﬂooding, local people’s
responses to ﬂoods, the evacuation and resettlement programme following the 2007 ﬂood. The paper
ﬁnds how adaptation to climate change becomes part of everyday politics, how actors aim to incorporate
responses into the continuation of their normal behavior and how elites are better positioned to take
advantage of adaptation programmes than the vulnerable people that were targeted. It argues that
climate change adaptation must be made consonant with historically grown and ongoing social and
institutional processes. It concludes with lessons that the analysis and methodology of the research can
provide for the practice of climate change adaptation.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. 
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This paper aims to explore the importance of the socio-political
and cultural dimensions of adaptation to climate change, using
the case of responses to ﬂoods in Mozambique. It conceptualizes
climate change adaptation as an arena where social actors at
different scales, from national to local, have different under-
standings of adaptation, interests and power which, combined,
signiﬁcantly affect the outcomes of government-driven adapta-
tion plans. We explore the connections and disjunctions between
different scales of adaptation policy and practice by adopting a
multi-sited ethnographic approach. We use vignettes examining
how climate change and ﬂood responses are framed in different
locales and scales. These are the politics of climate change
adaptation at the national institutional level, societal responses to
increased weather-related disasters, and the interaction between
government and local people’s responses to ﬂooding. In each of
these vignettes we study how actors appropriate ideas and
practices to align them with their own views, ambitions and
projects. Together, the vignettes provide a composite picture of* Corresponding author at: Disasterstudies, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen,
the Netherlands. Tel.: +31 317482472/651915934.
E-mail addresses: lartur@uem.mz (L. Artur), thea.hilhorst@wur.nl (D. Hilhorst).
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.the arena of climate change allowing us to ﬁnd cross-cutting
themes.
The paper builds on recent publications that suggest that the
successes and failures of climate change adaptation depend more
on societal perceptions and the sensitivity of institutions than on
the availability of appropriate policies, technologies or funding,
notwithstanding the importance of these last three aspects. We
ﬁnd that adaptation gets incorporated into the everyday politics of
politicians, bureaucrats, priests, businessmen, local chiefs and
people living in ﬂood plains. Flood responses and adaptation
programmes are emerging properties from these socio-political
and cultural processes and affect social ordering and differentia-
tion. Importantly, we ﬁnd that powerful people are better
positioned to take advantages of the politicization of climate
change adaptation, even though many programmes explicitly
target vulnerable people.
In Section 2 we propose our analytical framework of the arena
of climate change adaptation. Section 3 contains the methodology
and in Sections 4–8 we present our results in ﬁve vignettes. Section
9 concludes the paper and ends with some policy implications of
our ﬁndings, calling on the need for ﬂexible programming that
leans on qualitative monitoring, more inclusive governance of
adaptation and the popularization of scientiﬁc climate change
debates.
2 This project was coordinated by Dorothea Hilhorst and funded by the
Netherlands Organisation for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO). We are most grateful
for this contribution.
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This paper aims to contribute to the growing body of literature
that studies how the idea of climate change derives meaning and is
translated in everyday practices that affect people’s vulnerability
and adaptive capacity (Pettenger, 2007). As pointed out by Hulme
(2009, xxvi) climate change has become an idea that travels
beyond its origin in natural science, meeting world politics,
economics, popular culture, religion and in doing so, takes new
meanings and serves new purposes. Research in this tradition
focuses on a wide range of historical and contemporary social and
economic processes and practices that bring about vulnerability,
and seeks to understand how adaptation can be grounded in
existing policies and regulations, rather than deriving policy from
dictates of climate change modeling (Burton et al., 2002, 157;
Paavola and Adger, 2006, 596). A focus on everyday practices of
climate change adaptation must draw on historical analysis of how
people and societies have interacted with nature (Dovers, 2009). It
takes into account the context of socio-economic and demographic
changes, competition over natural resources, changing technolo-
gies, changes in global governance, social conventions and the
globalizing ﬂows of capital and labour (Leichenko and O’Brien,
2008; Christoplos, 2010). This makes it difﬁcult to detach climate
change induced adaptations from other policies and events (Kate,
2000, p. 13; Kelly and Adger, 2000, p. 329; Adger et al., 2005, p. 78).
In line with this emerging tradition, we adopt a constructivist
perspective on adaptation policy, where policy is not a ‘thing’ but
the outcome of social negotiation. Climate change is the concern of
many different actors and institutions that can be seen to
constitute an arena where this social negotiation (by all different
means) takes place. The positioning of actors toward the issue is
not a translation of a shared concern with the urgency of climate
change adaptation. It is also not a direct function of their political–
economic interests. Interests are usually neither clear nor
consistent, and even rights are often contradictory and subject
to interpretation (Paavola and Adger, 2006). The way people act in
their everyday politics is largely conditioned by institutional, social
and cultural patterns (Kelley and Scoones, 2003). Adaptation policy
can thus be seen as the result of a pattern of interaction between
the different participants, which try to shape the process in ways
that ﬁt their own perspectives of the problem and goals (Long and
Long, 1992; Colebatch, 1998; Hilhorst, 2003; Mosse, 2005; Barnett
and O’Neal, 2010).
This means that we step away from the notion of the policy
cycle model that underlies most adaptation programmes, in which
policy is the systematic pursuit of goals, and follow instead
empirically how policy is produced and implemented. Acknowl-
edging the complex dynamics of adaptation programmes shows
that government capacity, or the lack of it, is only one aspect of
climate change adaptation (Kate, 2000, p. 7; IPCC, 2001, p. 879). It
has been widely acknowledged that adaptation ultimately
depends on individual households and local managers of natural
resources in the context of local and regional economies and
societies (Handmer et al., 1999, pp. 268–269; Tol, 2005, p. 573).
The arena model that underlies this paper allows us to analyze how
adaptation may depend on multiple actors and institutions,
including, for example, churches and traditional leaders aiming
to strengthen their hold on their constituency.
This arena is loosely conﬁgured, yet different parts are
connected in co-producing notions, responses, policy and practice
around disasters and climate change adaptation. In order to
unravel the processes that lead to vulnerability or adaptive
capacity to climate change, we distinguish different domains of
response to risk and disaster (Hilhorst, 2004). We consider here the
domain of science and disaster management, the domain of
disaster governance and the domain of local responses. They arethe respective domains of scientists and development experts,
bureaucrats and politicians, and local producers and vulnerable
people. Although these domains are diverse in themselves, they
have a certain proximity, physical or discursive, in the ways in
which people refer to disaster and risk. In different locales we
study the interfaces between these domains, to understand how
different actors respond to weather-related disaster, in particular
ﬂoods, and how they appropriate the ideas and means of climate
change adaptation in practice. In this, we pay particular attention
to discourses as more or less coherent sets of references that frame
the way we understand and act upon the world around us. In
reality, there are always multiple discourses at work and one of our
foci is how actors align with and struggle over competing
discourses.
3. Study location and methodology
The present paper is based on research into the interpretations
and responses of different actors in Mozambique to disasters and
climate change adaptation.2 Data were collected during 18 months
in Mozambique, from January 2007 to July 2008 by Artur,
forthcoming, and some additional interviews in 2009 with key
informants in Maputo to update previous data.
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world and
ranks third on global weather-related damage, following
Bangladesh and Ethiopia (Buys et al., 2007). Natural hazards such
as droughts, ﬂoods, cyclones and related disasters have all been part
of Mozambican history, and have had an impact in shaping the
country’s poverty and vulnerability situation. In 2000, Southern
Mozambique was hit by a historical ﬂood, affecting 4.5 million
people and claiming about 700 lives. The 2001 ﬂood affected 500,000
people. The database of EM-DAT, which underlies most publications
on disasters in Mozambique (GoM, 1988, p. 27; Christie and Hanlon,
2001, pp. 13–14; Negra˜o, 2001, pp. 3–4; INGC, UEM and Fewsnet,
2003, pp. 10–12; World Bank, 2005, p. 29) shows that disasters have
increased in frequency and intensity over the past few decades. Since
1970, Mozambique was hit by 77 disasters, 41(53%) of which
occurred just in the past decade (2000–2009). In 2005, an estimated
94% of the population was affected by natural hazards (Mafambissa,
2007, p. 5). Droughts have historically been the major hazard but
ﬂooding is predominant in the present decade. Although the exact
relation between increased ﬂoods and climate change is still subject
to debate, the Mozambican Government considers disaster risk
reduction as an important component of climate change adaptation
(INGC, 2006). Its policy is based on the premise that by 2100,
temperatures have increased between 5 and 6 8C, resulting in severe
droughts, cyclones and ﬂoods (INGC, 2009).
Because people’s response to disasters are embedded into the
interpersonal, historical, cultural, organisational and global
environments they inhabit we need to capture the everyday
practices of disaster response and climate change adaptation. For
this, we adopted a multi-sited ethnographic approach (Marcus,
1995). Multi-sited ethnography is designed to study contemporary
local changes in culture and society. It acknowledges that such
changes are being multiply produced in different sites. There is no
central locus of representation that can unveil the working of
disaster response in Mozambique. What is written in policy and
what happens in meeting rooms in Maputo, in churches along the
Zambezi rivers, in villages and resettlement centres is physically
disconnected yet each of these sites are nonetheless connected
through different relationships of association, constitution, inter-
action or reaction. Multi-sited ethnography usually follows a group
4 Interview with ofﬁcer from MICOA, September 18, 2008 in Maputo, and ofﬁcer
from MPD, October 8, 2008 in Morrumbala.
5 Interview conducted on 28 May 2009 with Coordinator Ofﬁce Manager, INGC.
6 These include the Matola Gas Company (MGC), the Cimentos de Moc¸ambique
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1995). In this paper, we follow a concern: the increasing ﬂoods in
Mozambique that are framed as manifestation of climate change.
We bring together phenomena that appear to be apart and by
juxtaposing the different vignettes we follow how discourse
around climate-related disasters gets produced and what the
dominant trends as well as contradictions are that emerge.
A major strength of this methodology is that it allows for a
symmetrical analysis of stakeholders where we avoid two different
(and opposite) biases. The ﬁrst bias would be to locate culture,
stagnation and refusal in local people without questioning the
cultured properties of policy and governance. The second bias
would unravel the power politics of governance, while ignoring
everyday politics of people that are often represented as
disembodied communities of local knowledge and solidarity.
Our methodology allows us to cross-cut between dichotomies such
as national versus local, community versus government, or policy
versus implementation.
The vignettes of the paper draw on different methods. They
combine participant observation with historical research. The ﬁrst
two vignettes rely mainly on secondary data, key informant
interviews and observations of meetings and ceremonies. The last
three vignettes are derived from a year of intensive ﬁeldwork by
Artur, forthcoming in the village of Cocorico in Mopeia district,
Zambezia province with extended visits to the adjacent districts of
Chinde, Mutarara, Caia and Marromeu. Ethnographic ﬁeldwork uses
multiple methods, including participant observation, surveys,
informal interviews, group discussions, secondary data analysis,
extended case studies, discourse and content analysis (Hammersley
and Atkinson, 1983, pp. 23–24). Apart from participant observation,
Artur, forthcoming held a total of 16 group discussions; 78 semi-
structured interviews (50 with key informants, i.e. local leaders,
teachers, doctors, policy, soldiers, red cross volunteers); attended 16
church services, 2 funerals and 3 weddings. A survey was carried out
in Mopeia district to establish the differences in practices and
perceptions between people living in the ﬂoodplains and those
living on high grounds, covering 198 households. The position of the
researcher varied in these different sites, ranging from participant to
friend, greatly facilitated by his ﬂuency in Sena, and in some sites as
an academic speaking on equal terms to those being studied.
4. The national-level arena: government and donors
Our ﬁrst vignette concerns policy producing at the national
level. After the UNCED summit in 1992, Mozambique has gradually
developed a legal framework to cope with climate change. Under
the coordination of the Ministry for Coordination of Environmental
Action (MICOA), different working groups and regulatory tools
have been established to implement the national Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) and the National Action Plan for
Adaptation (NAPA). Despite these legal tools, the overall achieve-
ment of environmental sustainability (Millennium Development
Goal 7) is unlikely to be achieved by 2015 (GoM and UN, 2005). In
practice, the government is focusing more on MDG 1 (halve the
proportion of people living in extreme poverty).
Economic growth competes with environmental concerns. A
major economic policy has been to encourage private foreign
investments with different incentives such as limited taxation. Some
of these are (controversially) presented as climate-friendly, such as
the provision of land for producing biofuels3 and investments in
hydro-power, others will certainly increase greenhouse emissions
in the years to come. Forests, in the meantime, are being depleted
by exportation of wood to China, which some ironically refer to as
the ‘Chinese takeaway’ (Mackenzie, 2006). The effect of the3 http://knowledge.cta.int/ (accessed 13.12.09).government’s preoccupation with development, although under-
standable, is that climate-change adaptation becomes a competing
claim in the allocation of budgets. Decision-making often entails
negotiation between the two interests.
In the meantime, international adaptation programmes in
Mozambique are increasing. Major programmes in 2009 were:
Joint Program in Environmental Mainstreaming and Adaptation to
Climate Change in Mozambique funded by MDG-F Spain and
UNDP; Mozambique Poverty and Environment Initiative funded by
the government of Ireland; Joint Program on Strengthening
Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness funded by
UNDP; Coping with Drought and Adaptation to Climate Change
funded by GEF; and a World Bank study that was expected to result
in a Fund for Climate Change Adaptation.
These programmes have led to competition among government
bodies. Development agencies, especially the Ministry for Planning
and Development (MPD), have questioned MICOA’s authority by
claiming that climate change is a developmental more than an
environmental problem. This has created (backstage) conﬂicts
between MICOA and MPD over coordination.4 Another claimant to
the position of coordinator is the Ministry for Science and
Technology (MCT), which handles interventions regarding science
and technology (MCT, 2006).
The National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) also has
increased its inﬂuence on climate change adaptation programmes.
It has broadened its mandate by incorporating prevention,
vulnerability reduction, reconstruction and development of
drought-prone areas. Due to its strong reputation since the
2000/2001 ﬂoods, many international agencies have a preference
to work with INGC. INGC is handling projects with UNDP, DFID,
GTZ, World Bank, FAO, and the Nordic countries among others.5
INGC has also produced the ﬁrst national study on climate change.
At the launch of the study in Maputo in May 2009, which Artur,
forthcoming attended, the coordination of climate change
adaptation became a contentious issue, and many guests from
competing institutions perceived the initiative as an attempt by
INGC to claim the leadership. The climate adaptation arena is
further complicated by the entry of municipalities, which develop
interventions in their areas of jurisdiction. On the non-govern-
mental and private side, adaptation programmes are organised by
agencies like the Mozambican Red Cross, Care international, GTZ,
and World Vision, and the private sector has seen different
companies ask for certiﬁcates to access funds under the CDM.6
The emerging property of this unfolding arena is a lack of
coherent strategy and leadership for adapting to climate change.
This leads to a dispersion of projects, efforts and funds. Rather than
displaying a uniﬁed concern to prepare the country for increasing
disasters, national level actors thus politicize adaptation and make
it subject to bureaucratic competition. This produces a fragmented
ﬁeld of adaptation programmes where actors in other domains ﬁnd
room for manoeuvre to bend climate change interventions to their
own understanding, needs and rules.
5. Societal discourses on increased weather-related disasters
and social order
Our second vignette concerns the societal understanding of
increased disasters. The scientiﬁc explanations of climate change
are not widely known in Mozambique, and people ﬁnd different(CM) and the Electricity company (EDM). Interview with ofﬁcer from MICOA,
Maputo May 27, 2009.
Fig. 1. A national newspaper reporting lynching related to the lack of rainfall. The heading and subheading say: Justice begins to judge lynching: 23 people in Zambezia will
answer for encouraging the killing of ‘witches’ that ‘held-up’ the rain.
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events. We discuss three alternative discourses of attribution that
explain disasters as the will of God, the ancestors and the
wrongdoing of witchcraft. These so-called cosmological inter-
pretations are widespread in Mozambique (MICOA, 2006, p. 19).
The ﬁrst discourse turns to a religious explanation of disasters
and attributes climate change to the will of God (see also Schipper,
2010). It comes in a benign and a threatening variation. One of the
respondents objected during a workshop on an adaptation project:
‘‘Nobody can claim droughts and ﬂoods. Only God can decide when to
send rain or not!’’ This turned out to be a popular explanation that
was actively propagated by church leaders. In 16 services attended
in local churches along the Lower Zambezi and the Zambezi river
basin, Artur, forthcoming found priests talking about ﬂoods in their
sermons. Typically, a priest would pray for those who lost their
lives and belongings. He would refer to God as all-powerful – able
to command ﬂoods and droughts, and responsible for choosing
who lives or dies. Mourners should ﬁnd comfort in the afterlife
awaiting the deceased. These sermons had three important social
roles. They provided comfort to the survivors, helped them make
peace with their situation, and enhanced solidarity with victims.
In some churches, the priest used different Bible verses, where
increased ﬂooding, drought and other natural hazards were
understood in connection to the end of the world and the urgent
need for people to follow the church’s guidance. While the latter is
obviously geared toward enhancing the inﬂuence of the church,
the comforting variation can also be seen as reproducing social
order, because ﬂooding and droughts are seen as produced by
forces beyond humankind. Both variations diffuse social tension
and strengthen the church’s grasp of people. They do not recognize
potentials for mitigation and adaptation to climate change.
A second explanation for disasters in Mozambique was found in
the role of ancestors. Ancestors play a large role in the lifeworlds of
Mozambicans. They have to be placated by rituals that precede
major events, the launch of new public works or development
interventions. This is the domain of traditional leaders who are the
medium to ancestors and reproduce these beliefs. When there is a
lack of rainfall, the traditional leaders in some regions of the
country perform rituals to ask forgiveness from the ancestors and
make peace with them. Evidence was found in group interviews
about such rituals in Canhungue, Mutarara District in 2003, in
Xinsomba, Chinde District in 2005, and in Cocorico-Mopeia district
in 2006. Searching for protection from ancestors reinforces and
strengthens traditional leadership. Like the priests, ‘traditional’
leaders understanding of extreme events beyond living creatures
has the effect of strengthening their hold over the people.A third alternative discourse that was found concerns
witchcraft. Some people associate misfortunes such as droughts,
rainfall and ﬂooding with the inﬂuence of people believed to be
witches. In June 2009, newspapers in Mozambique reported about
alleged witches who were thought to have put off rainfall (Fig. 1).
Some of them were lynched by local people in districts of the
Zambe´zia province in order to seek ‘justice’. In a television
interview in the ﬁrst week of June 2009, interviewees tended to
blame the lack of rain to those who were better off: ‘‘They only make
it rain on their own ﬁelds, so only they have production and become
rich’’.
More than the other two discourses, this discourse displays a
(misdirected) sense of social injustice. And it is obviously
disruptive. While the other two discourses usually remain
uncontested by the government, the lynching incidents provoked
not only the arrest of the perpetrators, but also an immediate
campaign to send teams from the National Institute of Meteorolo-
gy to local areas to explain what generates droughts and ﬂooding
and why rainfall patterns are changing.
The three discourses all attribute climate events to supernatural
forces. They are all permeated by local values that inﬂuence how
households are affected by and respond to climate impacts (see also
Agrawal et al., 2008). Yet, they simultaneously hide the role of social
institutions, economic processes and political choices that contrib-
ute to people’s vulnerability to natural hazards. This is reinforced by
traditional leaders and priests who interpret climate change toward
reinforcing the existing order. Even the government only seeks to
intervene when the social order is challenged, as in the case of the
witchcraft accusations. The latter expressed people’s discontent like
no other, and compelled the government to reach down to people
with educational campaigns on climate change.
Local explanations of disasters, as this vignette demonstrates,
thus have a strong sub-text in reinforcing social order and power.
The next vignettes will continue on this theme and show how local
people seek to minimize the disruption of disaster and ﬁnd
continuity in their lifestyle.
6. People’s responses to climate-related disaster on the delta
Zambezi
Flooding on the Zambezi delta in Mozambique is a historical
phenomenon with records dating back as far as 1586 (Chidia-
massamba and Liesegang, 1997). In the 19th century, 21 big ﬂoods
have been recorded (Monteiro, 1955; Beilfuss, 2005). The delta
constitutes a ﬂood plain that houses almost one million people,
mainly from the Sena ethnic group (INE, 2007). They build their
Table 1
Investment priorities in the Cocorico ﬂoodplain and Mopeia village. Percentage of
households owning the item or average number of item per household.
Item Research area Cocorico (N = 84)
Mopeia village (N = 114)
Percentage
Radio Cocorico 67.85%
Mopeia village 57.01%
Canoe Cocorico 64.42%
Mopeia village 10.52%
Plates (average units
per household)
Cocorico 5.63
Mopeia village 8.92
Cups (average units
per household)
Cocorico 4.24
Mopeia village 5.69
Bike Cocorico 59.52%
Mopeia village 50.87%
Fishing nets Cocorico 51.19%
Mopeia village 32.45%
Spoons (average units
per household)
Cocorico 3.58
Mopeia village 5.78
Chicken/ducks (average
units per household)
Cocorico 5.20
Mopeia village 3.62
Goats Cocorico 13.09%
Mopeia village 18.45%
Pigs Cocorico 21.42%
Mopeia village 19.42%
Cows Cocorico 0
Mopeia village 0
Table 2
Polygamy.
Frequency by study area
Cocorico Mopeia village Total
Polygamy in the study area
Are you under polygamy Yes 64(76%) 27(24%) 91
No 20(24%) 87(76%) 107
Total 84(100%) 114(100%) 198
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trading. Their lifestyles are highly inﬂuenced by ﬂooding regimes.
They take advantage of the Zambezi River and its ecosystem, and
have developed numerous adaptation practices against ﬂooding.
These are often incorporated in everyday livelihood strategies and
many of them are tacit. In the research area of Cocorico, a highly
ﬂood-prone village of 1500 inhabitants in 2007, people have
developed adaptation practices that permeate their entire lifestyle.
Houses are located on heights or constructed with grass and
wood. The use of local material may be related to poverty but is also
considered ‘rational’ because investments in brick houses may be
washed away by ﬂoods. Survey data further show a different pattern
of investments of households in ﬂood-prone areas (see Table 1).
Households in ﬂood-prone Cocorico mainly invest in canoes, ﬁshing
nets, radios and poultry. Households in Mopeia village own more
plates, cups, spoons and goats. Canoes and radios have additional
functions beyond their everyday use, in serving as warning
mechanism and means of transport during extreme ﬂoods. The
survey indicates that there is a tendency to avoid accumulating big
animals such as goats and cattle or large furniture such as
mattresses, beds and tables that would get lost in ﬂoods.7
People also adapt through social arrangements that develop
over time. They create interdependencies, for example through
polygamous marriages (often with one household near the river,
and the other in a higher area to ensure that the entire polygamous
household has a secure place during ﬂoods), and through festivities
and drinking that are important aspects of social life in the ﬂood
plains.8 Our survey found that 76% of the households in Cocorico7 In group discussions people on the ﬂoodplains suggested that small poultry
such as chicken has multiple advantages. It is easier to carry during evacuations; it
is easier to sell if needed; it reproduces fast and, due to its lower monetary, losing it
during ﬂooding is less painful if compared with animal of higher monetary value.
For bigger animals, they tend to prefer pigs rather than goats. The major
explanation, apart from its faster reproductive capacity, was that pigs are better at
resisting ﬂooding compared to goats.
8 Group discussions Canhungue (Mutarara District) May 23, 2007; Inhangoma
(Mutarara District) September 10, 2008; Xitsomba (Chinde district) June 15, 2007;
Luabo (Chinde District) October 23, 2007; Cocorico (Mopeia District) September 24,
2007 and Chupanga (Marromeu District) March 11, 2007. Interview besides group
discussions with local governmental authority traditional leaders in Canhungue;
traditional leader regulo in Cocorico; traditional leader regulo of Chamanga in
Mopeia May 7, 2008.were polygamous with an average of 2.5 wives per male, against
24% of Mopeia with 2 wives per male (see Table 2).
People’s adaptive strategies thus encompass much more than
the diversiﬁcation of livelihoods that received attention in
literature (Osbahr et al., 2008). They range from ﬂood-prooﬁng
houses to investment strategies to all kinds of social arrangements,
including polygamy that constitute people’s everyday life and can
simultaneously be understood as protection against ﬂoods.
However, the balance between these different factors that
constitute people’s adaptive lifestyles has come increasingly under
pressure.9 The threats are environmental, economic, political,
social and cultural. They range from the inﬂuence of dams and
deforestation to the deterioration of the traditional leadership that
guarded the interdependencies of the villagers. As a result of these
threats, the intensiﬁcation of ﬂoods has coincided with a complex
process toward increased vulnerability to ﬂooding (see also Patt
and Scho¨ter, 2008). Increasingly, this makes people susceptible to
the societal discourses surrounding ﬂoods as described above. And
increasingly, people have to depend on aid to cope with ﬂoods.
7. The evacuation programme following the 2007 ﬂooding of
the Zambezi River
In 2007, central Mozambique experienced heavy rainfall. As it
also rained in neighbouring countries, the upstream Kariba and
Cahora Bassa dams had to be partly opened. On February 8, the
water ﬂow peaked at 10,404 m3/s (more than during the 2001
ﬂood), affecting nearly all the lower lying areas along the Zambezi
river. There were no casualties, and the government of Mozambi-
que (GoM) counted 163,045 affected people, from which 107,534
were displaced (INGC, 2007). This vignette deals with the
evacuation process that was initiated by the government when
the water started to rise.
After the 2001 ﬂoods, the government invested heavily in its
ﬂood response capacity. The 2007 ﬂoods provided the opportunity
to put these to the test. When the medium term weather forecasts
anticipated the rains in October 2006, planning began and the GoM
disbursed US$ 5 million toward the response. As waters continued
to rise, the government declared a red alert and ordered the
evacuation of people in the Zambezi ﬂoodplains on 4 February.
Three days later, the army was assigned to forcibly evacuate people
who continued to defy the evacuation instruction. Coercive search
and rescue missions brought people to resettlement centres
created by the government. On March 10, the government lifted
the red alert.
The search and rescue operation was severely hampered by
people who refused to evacuate or returned to their houses
immediately after evacuation. The government and newspaper
reports labelled this in terms of stupidity, irrationality, reluctance
and backwardness.10 One local leader was imprisoned because
he allegedly instigated his people to return home. Numerous9 Eriksen et al. (2009) reach a similar conclusion for villages in South
Mozambique.
10 See for example, Noticias newspaper February 7; BBC February 8; Washington
Post February 14; Reuters February 15.
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Fig. 2. The hierarchical response.
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their own rationalities for dealing with the ﬂood. While the search
and rescue was geared toward saving lives, people took a broader
perspective and aimed to safeguard their livelihoods as well.
For local people, evacuation is a strategy of last resort. It is a
risky process as animals cannot be taken along and properties may
be looted during their absence. People display a hierarchy of
responses according to the severity of the ﬂoods (see Fig. 2). They
will ﬁrst move their belongings to the main house located on
higher grounds. When the water level rises, they will prepare to
live in their granaries that are built on poles mainly to protect
grains from animals. When water levels threaten the granary, they
move away from their homestead to ﬁnd accommodation nearby
in the local hills. Only when this does not sufﬁce, people are willing
to move away entirely. When the rescue teams arrived after the red
alert has been issued, the situation was not deemed very alarming
by local standards. In most of Cocorico, waters had just inundated
the ﬂoors of the main houses and people were not willing, nor
prepared to evacuate.
People will only accept helicopter rescue when their lives are in
immediate danger. The evacuation operation availed of four
helicopters and ﬁve large boats. People used an estimated 1000
private canoes (Foley, 2007, p. 15). Even if the government would
have had more means, people would prefer their own canoes.11
Helicopter rescue tends to separate families, whereas households
typically want to stay together in times of crisis (Raphael, 1986, p.
47). This was especially complicated because many families in the
ﬂoodplains of the Zambezi River continue, as we have seen for the
case of Cocorico in Section 6, to be polygamous, resulting in
complex and large households. Another reason why people
preferred to evacuate in their own canoes, was the strict ‘people
only approach’ of the rescue teams. This meant that livelihood
assets such as livestock, ﬁshing nets and tools had to be left behind
which would result in devastating losses for poor households
(Lautze, 1997). A woman in the Amilcar Cabral resettlement centre
complained on February 14: ‘‘we are not allowed to carry our
belongings but we are taken like belongings. I do not know where my
husband is and my son’’. People also preferred to move in their
canoes to maintain their dignity. As somebody put it ‘Ine sine Nkuku
para kwatiwa- I am not a chicken to be carried’.
We found rescue also to be highly gendered. People strategize
about the question who will be evacuated, often opting for the11 Group discussion in Inhangoma (Mutarara district) September 10, 2008;
Cocorico (Mopeia district) September 24, 2007; Luabo (Chinde district) October 23,
2007 and Chupanga (Marromeu district) March 11, 2007.women and children to leave (and ensure access to aid) while men
stay behind to protect property and take care of animals. Men with
multiple wives did not want to register in a centre because it would
force them to chose between the wives. This would have serious
repercussions for their relationships and could even lead to divorce
and the loss of their position of fatherhood.12 Being rescued creates
social obligations and people feel it is more respectful to rescue
than be rescued, which is related to norms of masculinity. This was
why many local chiefs chose to be the last to be evacuated, defying
the governmental decree that they should go ﬁrst to set the
example.
All in all, it can be stated that the general evacuation decreed by
the government did not harmonize with people’s responses to
ﬂoods and was to some extent premature. Most interviewed
people argued behind the scenes that they would have been able to
handle the situation themselves. With the rescue operation just
completed, the government then launched an ambitious plan for
the permanent resettlement of 54,000 affected families. If the
evacuation was problematic, the resettlement program was even
much more complicated.
8. Resettlement as a permanent solution
This ﬁnal vignette is about the differentiated responses to the
permanent resettlement of ﬂood-affected families. Mozambique
has had a long history of resettlement processes that have
displaced millions of people in the context of economic develop-
ment, villagization programmes, and resettlement of the displaced
of the civil war (Coelho, 1993; Taju, 1992; Vines, 1996; UNHCR,
1996; Newitt, 1988; Filipe, 2003). In view of this tradition, the
resettlement programme after the ﬂoods was much more than a
‘spatial’ reallocation to protect people against recurring ﬂooding. It
represented an ambition to ‘modernize’ the people from lower
Zambezi. The government emphasized the modern design of the
new settlements with casas de cemente, modern infrastructure and
services. It also aimed to integrate people better in the markets by
modernizing agriculture with high-yielding variety seeds. This
means that people would have to reinvent themselves in a ‘modern
lifestyle’ of taxation, lined cement houses, associational life and
market integration (cf. Downing, 1996, 2002; Feldman et al., 2003;
Oliver-Smith, 2005).
The implementation of the resettlement policy has been beset
with many complications. Patt and Scho¨ter (2008) found that
people refused to cooperate with evacuations and resettlement
after the 2000 ﬂood, because of their different perception of
climate change. This articulates with our ﬁndings in the previous
sections about local response to evacuation. However, in the case
of the resettlement programme we found that people did not
refuse the programme as such, but they used forms of social
negotiation of the conditions of resettlement. People were seeking
room for manoeuvre to make the best of it. This is apparent in the
registration practices and the construction of houses.
People’s way of dealing with resettlement displays a strategy to
selectively incorporate what they consider the opportunities,
while maximizing the continuation with their normal way of life.
Many people are disinclined to move permanently to the new
sites,13 but they nonetheless like to register for housing to be
grounded in multiple locations and diversify their livelihood
strategies. Especially in the ﬁrst period after the ﬂood, there was a
lot of spurious registration. We found that people would inﬂate the
size of families; register at different centres; split the household
members between different centres; or apply for settlement12 Interview with local chief in Cocorico, July 8, 2007.
13 Many regarded their relationship with ancestors as one reason. For instance ‘we
cannot leave our ancestors burial because it may bring along misfortune’.
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characterized as a set of strategies and counter-strategies to
control the registration process. The government and aid agencies
would devise different strategies, ranging from nocturnal checks,
the use of gentian violet ink, and police intimidation. People, on the
other hand, redistributed aid according to their own criteria and
invested time on ‘intelligence work from below’ to make sure to be
present at census-taking exercises in the centres.15
Resettlement is still ongoing. The construction of houses in the
ﬁrst phase, that was included in our research, was characterized by
processes of elite capture. The stakes in the location and quality of
the houses were high and people tried to get the best locations and
highest level of services. Leaders are much better positioned than
poor households in this competition. While the government
planned homogeneous communities where each family would be
allotted plots of 30–40 m2 (according to the international
humanitarian Sphere standards), differentiation became visible
from the start, with families claiming larger plots or being left with
smaller ones. This was only partly explainable by reference to
needs (household size) and was much more a reﬂection of power
differentials. The government provided house designs with two or
three rooms. The three room houses became known as the chief’s
houses; and the two room houses as the public’s design. In the
research areas of Mopeia District, only chiefs occupied three-room
houses. Differentiation was further created because families had to
produce their own bricks, which poor or female-headed house-
holds could not easily manage. To occupy a plot one needed to have
ﬁnished the brick-production and as a result the plots near the road
became occupied by the better-off. The disaster policies of the
government thus led to the reinforcement of social differentiation
and elite formation in the area.
9. Concluding analysis
This paper analyzed the arena of climate change adaptation in
Mozambique through ﬁve vignettes: the national policy domain,
societal discourses on weather-related disaster, local adaptation
practices, the evacuation and resettlement programme after the
2007. For each of these we brought out how dynamics are shaped
by interactions between international interventions, the govern-
ment and other power holders, and local people.
A major ﬁnding throughout the vignettes is that the emergency
discourse prevailing internationally around climate change does
not resonate with any of the actors in Mozambique. While actors
take the adaptation agenda to some extent seriously, in everyday
practice it gets incorporated in bureaucratic politicking, social
manipulation and everyday politics of competing claims over
resources.
Secondly, we can observe that the stakes of climate change are
high in two ways. Climate change is said to result in increased
ﬂooding which has a visible effect on Mozambique. The stakes are
also high in the sense that international attention to climate
change has opened up an arena of contestation over ideas and
resources. At the national level, the availability of international
programmes has unleashed a competitive bid for coordination
among national institutions at the detriment of a co-ordinated
approach. Locally, people try to expand their room for manoeuvre
by appropriating opportunities provided by evacuation and
resettlement programmes in their own projects and livelihood
strategies.
Thirdly, we found a remarkable cross-cutting tendency
that institutions and people alike tend to seek continuity by14 Group discussion with Red Cross volunteers in Mopeia, September 20, 2008.
15 Interview with local chiefs at the resettlement centre 24 de Julho, September
23, 2008 and resettlement centre Zonas Verdes, September 24, 2008.incorporating the climate change agenda in their lifestyles and
institutional interests. Authorities and churches tend to explain
climate change in a way that reinforces social order and afﬁrms
their control. They avoid creating consciousness that climate
change is human-induced and hence may be effectively countered
by mitigation measures. Local people, on the other hand, respond
to disasters by holding on as much as possible to their normal
lifestyles. They develop a hierarchy of measures that allow them to
make disaster as little disruptive as possible.
Fourthly, we found in every vignette evidence of clashes or
contradictions within and between the domains of governance,
international interventions and people. To highlight a few:
government policy is torn between addressing climate change
and development concerns. Everyday discourses of climate change
have little relation to scientiﬁc understandings of the phenomena.
Rather than being ignorant or superstitious, they are being
propagated by power holders that explain climate change in ways
that reinforce the social order. It was only when a discourse on
witchcraft emerged that disrupted social order that the govern-
ment embarked on a campaign to render people’s understanding of
climate change more scientiﬁc. The resettlement programme
brings out contradictions between internationally endorsed
notions of living with the ﬂoods with the government’s desire for
permanent resettlement into a long tradition of resettlement
schemes that enhance public control over people. Our narratives of
the evacuation and resettlement bring out numerous ways in
which government policy disarticulates with people’s strategies.
Finally, we ﬁnd that technocratic responses to the challenge of
climate change adaptation take place in a social context of
signiﬁcant inequality and differential power. They are being
politicized in practice as actors endeavour to appropriate them
according to their own interpretations and interests. People that
are powerful – economically, socially or politically – tend to be
more successful in this, and the risk that poor and vulnerable
people get further marginalized in processes of climate change
adaptation is substantial. This is alarming considering the explicit
objective of many disaster response programmes (including the
resettlement programme in Mozambique) to target the poor as the
primary beneﬁciaries.
Taken together, the vignettes make clear that responses to
climate-related hazards are complex and need to be understood by
taking into account the historical and contemporary processes
beyond climate and disaster. Adaptation interventions do not take
place in a vacuum, but get shaped in an arena of different and often
conﬂicting interests.
This leaves us with the question what our ﬁndings and
approach can mean in practice? We have presented a multi-sited
ethnography that shows how policies and responses to climate-
related disasters come about and get altered in numerous sites.
Actors negotiate adaptation in their everyday practice. The more
explicit these negotiations are, the better they can become subject
to policy interventions. This means investing in multi-stakeholder
governance arrangements around climate change adaptation. The
analysis also gives a sobering view on the steering power of
policies and programme objectives which appear limited in
practice. More attention is, therefore, needed for the process of
policy-making and implementation. Among others, this points to
the importance of building into programmes a strong monitoring
function, including qualitative monitoring for unintended out-
comes, and retain ﬂexibility to adjust programmes accordingly.
Finally, our methodology of multi-sited ethnography can also
have activating power. Certain patterns, interactions and contra-
dictions can only become visible when approaching the arena from
different sides. Policy makers and staff of programmes could
likewise learn from exposure to different sites of the adaptation
arena. Researchers that have a privileged view of different sites
L. Artur, D. Hilhorst / Global Environmental Change 22 (2012) 529–536536may become more active in popularizing their ﬁndings to
encourage informed debate. The unique position of Artur,
forthcoming in navigating the different sites, has resulted in a
culture-critical novel on disaster response that will be published in
Mozambique in parallel to this academic publication (Artur,
forthcoming).
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